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Small and micro enterprises are usually majority-owned by entrepreneurs. Using a unique 
sample of loan applications from such firms, we study the role of owners’ gender in bank credit 
decisions and post-credit-decision firm outcomes. We find that, ceteris paribus, female 
entrepreneurs are more prudent loan applicants than are males, since they are less likely to apply 
for credit or to default after loan origination. The relatively more aggressive behavior of male 
applicants pays off, however, in terms of higher average firm performance after loan origination.  
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Are male entrepreneurs more aggressive credit applicants compared to female 
entrepreneurs? Do banks treat male and female entrepreneurs differently? Are there any 
differences in the performance of female- and male-owned firms following bank credit decisions 
(loan origination or rejection)? These questions are important for our understanding of the role of 
gender in corporate finance and banking. If gender indeed plays a role in entrepreneurial 
decisions to apply for credit, this phenomenon can trigger a sequence of events at the firm level, 
ultimately affecting firm performance and real economic outcomes. These effects are especially 
important for small firms that do not usually have recourse to alternative sources of conventional 
finance outside of private equity (internal or external) and bank credit (Berg, 2018) and, as 
highlighted by the European Commission (EC) (2014) and the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development/European Union (OECD/EU) (2017), female-owned firms are on 
average smaller and more likely to have single ownership. 
 We identify entrepreneurs as majority owners of small and micro firms, following the 
relevant definition of the European Commission (total assets less than €10 million). Our first two 
questions concern whether male entrepreneurs are more aggressive credit applicants than are 
female entrepreneurs, and whether such aggression is the result of differential loan demand or 
supply between genders. Research backing the loan-demand premise suggests that debt aversion 
mostly characterizes female entrepreneurs because of higher risk aversion than among males 
(Carter, Shaw, Lam, and Wilson (2007), Dawson and Henley (2015)). Additional reasons include 
different motivations for female entrepreneurs, especially a higher demand for autonomy and a 
lower inclination toward firm growth. In turn, supply-side premises note that, in their credit 
decisions, banks value elements such as female-owned firm underperformance, differential levels 
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of education between male and female entrepreneurs, and the fact that female-owned firms are 
typically smaller and younger. Other studies suggest that loan officers discriminate against 
female entrepreneurs, especially when the former are male (Qi, Ongena, and Cheng (2019)). 
Recent evidence does not fully back up these propositions (for a recent review, see Dean, Larsen, 
Ford, and Akram (2019)), however, while the literature identifies such effects to be more 
pronounced in less developed economies (Asiedu, Kalonda-Kanyama, Ndikumana, and Nti-
Addae (2013), Ongena and Popov (2016)).  
 Future performance indicators such as future profitability and the probability of default 
might be affected if female-owned businesses were less likely to apply for credit or if access to 
credit supply were restricted. Concerning the probability of firm default (after a bank’s credit 
decision), the effects can go either way. On the one hand, obtaining more credit implies higher 
leverage. If this results from less prudent behavior by male entrepreneurs, or if the additional 
credit is not directed toward purely productive ends, however, the probability of default for male-
owned firms will be higher. On the other hand, if additional credit to male-owned firms implies 
profitable investments, then future profitability ratios will be higher and the corresponding 
probability of default lower. Our study is the first to pinpoint the effects of the differential 
likelihood of loan application and bank credit decisions (loan origination or rejection) on the 
default probability and performance of male- vs. female-owned firms.  
We empirically answer our research questions using data on loan applications to a large 
(systemic) European bank with nationwide coverage. For each loan application, we have full 
information on several applicant characteristics (gender, income, wealth, family, age, education, 
etc.); firm characteristics for which the applicant is majority owner (including the firm’s 
financial characteristics and region); loan characteristics (e.g., loan amount, maturity, collateral, 
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purpose); and the bank’s loan decision (approved or rejected). Importantly, we have access to the 
applicant’s credit score on which the bank based its credit decision. We also know whether the 
applicant has an exclusive relationship with the bank: Applicants with such a relationship are 
credit constrained (even from other conventional banks) if a specific bank rejects their 
application. Using these data and repeated loan applications by the same applicants, we construct 
a panel dataset of loan applicants over the period 2002-2017 (we observe the same applicant over 
time).  
 To determine whether male applicants are more likely than females to apply for a loan, 
we use a model that includes the applicant’s credit score. We show that this is an important 
variable, encompassing information on several characteristics observed by bank loan officers 
(soft information) that cannot be captured by the relevant hard information disclosed in the loan 
application. We find that the probability that male entrepreneurs apply for credit is 0.8 percent 
higher than that for female entrepreneurs. The results are quite similar (the estimate is 1.2 
percent) when using an instrumental-variable (IV) method to overcome potential endogeneity 
concerns (mainly due to the omitted-variable bias). Our IV represents the average, by industry, 
region, and year, for female entrepreneurs 15 years before a loan application. Overall, the effect 
of gender on the probability of loan application, even though statistically significant, is 
economically moderate.  
 We next examine whether there are differences in the probability of loan origination (the 
supply-side premise). When controlling for the probability of loan application (estimated under 
our first research question), we find the effect of gender to be statistically insignificant. 
Similarly, we find that gender does not significantly affect the loan amount and spread of 
originated loans.  
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Given these results, we next examine whether rejected male applicants reapply for loans 
sooner (within one or two years post a bank’s credit decision) compared to female applicants. In 
an interesting finding for the whole lending process, we find that this is indeed the case: Our IV 
estimations show that female applicants are 3.5 percent (4.2 percent) less likely to reapply within 
one (two) year(s) post loan rejection.         
Having established that male entrepreneurs are somewhat more active in seeking credit 
from their bank, especially when they have been rejected, we seek to answer the question as to 
whether this behavior pays off in terms of future firm performance. We examine the role of 
credit demand (given that the role of credit supply is insignificant) in the nexus between gender 
and firm performance. To this end, the bank’s credit score creates a sharp discontinuity between 
applicants whose loans are approved and those rejected (or those subject to additional review at a 
later stage). Thus, our identification approach relies on a regression discontinuity design (RDD), 
with the credit score being the assignment variable (Berg (2018)). This implies identification 
from comparing changes in measures of future firm performance of approved and denied 
applicants with credit scores around the cutoff prior to the bank’s credit decision. We estimate 
the RDD separately for male and female applicants and our preferred specification relies on 
standard nonparametric techniques (Cattaneo, Titiunik, and Vazquez-Bare (2016); Delis, 
Fringuellotti, and Ongena (2019)). All relevant tests suggest that loan applicants cannot 
manipulate their credit scores, and graphical evidence clearly points to a sharp discontinuity. 
Our results suggest that male loan applicants’ firms have a higher default probability 
three years after bank credit decisions (by approximately 2.1 percent) compared to those of 
female loan applicants. Furthermore, male applicants are more aggressive in reapplying for a 
loan once rejected. Specifically, rejected male applicants are three percent (4.2 percent) more 
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likely to apply for a loan in the one (two)-year window post the original rejection (compared to 
rejected female applicants). Given this finding, we also show that firms of male applicants have 
higher leverage levels three years after bank credit decisions. These findings are consistent with 
the premise that female entrepreneurs are more prudent loan applicants. 
An important question arising from these results is whether and how the tradeoff between 
the additional credit and higher probability of firm default for male entrepreneurs affects firm 
performance. We show that, for female-owned firms, positive bank credit decisions increase 
firms’ return on assets (ROA) three years onward by approximately 29 percent (compared to the 
average ROA of female-owned firms). For male-owned firms, however, the equivalent increase 
is approximately 38 percent. We show that most of this nine-percent difference in forward ROA 
is indeed due to male entrepreneurs’ aggressiveness in applying for credit. Specifically, when 
controlling for the probabilities of loan application and firm default (as estimated within our 
previous analysis), the effect of gender on forward ROA is minimal.  
The key implications drawn from our results are as follows: Female entrepreneurs are 
somewhat more prudent loan applicants; the lower probability of their applying for credit pays 
off in terms of lower firm default after loan origination. However, the relatively more aggressive 
behavior of male applicants pays off in terms of higher average firm performance after loan 
origination, a mechanism that explains a large part of the difference in performance between 
male- and female-owned firms. This difference is negligible when controlling for the probability 
of applying for credit and of firm default.          
Our research relates to two broad and interrelated strands of literature on the role of gender 
in financial access and firm performance. The first strand aims to identify the reasons behind 
gender-related differential access to finance. Muravyev, Talavera, and Schäfer (2009), Alesina, 
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Lotti, and Mistrulli (2013), Bellucci, Borisov, and Zazzaro (2010), Beck, Behr, and Guettler 
(2012), and Ongena and Popov (2016) provide evidence for gender discrimination in bank credit 
decisions, while other studies suggest that discrimination is very limited if present at all (Asiedu 
et al. (2013)), especially in more developed economies (Delis and Papadopoulos (2018)). Other 
studies suggest that the nature of female-owned firms (smaller firms with lower startup capital) 
causes these differences, which might be attributed to differences in risk-taking incentives, 
financial motivations (especially shying away from competition), education, connections, and 
autonomy (Alsos, Isaksen, and Ljunggren (2006), Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), Roper and 
Scott (2009), Alesina, Lotti, and Mistrulli (2013), Piacentini (2013), and Fang and Huang (2017)). 
In contrast, several studies suggest that such effects are due to external unobserved factors, and 
that similarities between the sexes are more important than are their differences (Ahl (2006); Dean, 
Larsen, Ford, and Akram (2019)).  
The second and even more general strand of literature considers how gender affects firm 
performance (for a recent review, see Dean et al., 2019). Earlier studies (e.g., Baker, Aldrich, and 
Liou (1997)) allege that female attributes are key to the understanding of the so-called 
“underperformance hypothesis” of female-owned firms, which emanates from stylized facts 
showing a gender gap in entrepreneurship (EU (2014), OECD/EU (2017)). However, recent 
studies using better data and identification techniques challenge this view (Coleman (2007), 
Conroy and Weiler (2016)). In the finance literature, a natural laboratory for the gender-firm 
performance relationship is composition of firms’ or banks’ boards (e.g., Huang and Kisgen 
(2013), Schwartz-Ziv (2017)). Several studies show a positive effect of gender diversity on the 
board on firm performance (e.g., Chen, Leung, and Goergen (2016), and references therein). 
Other studies, however, suggest that gender diversity does not necessarily imply better 
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performance (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Sila, Gonzalez, and Hagendorff (2016), Schwartz-Ziv 
(2017)). Recently, Karavitis, Kokas, and Tsoukas  (2019) show that board gender diversity 
lowers corporate loan spreads. Our study relates to these general strands of literature and draws 
on them in many theoretical and empirical respects, but is also the first to pinpoint and analyze 
all steps in the role of bank credit in the nexus between gender and firm performance. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes our data set. Section 3 
discusses the empirical analysis, stressing our identification approaches for the different 
questions, and analyzes the empirical results. Section 4 concludes the paper.  
 
II. Data 
We source our data from a major European bank, for which we have access to its full loan 
portfolio between 2002 and 2017. We use data for the bank’s loans to domestic small and micro 
firms (total assets of up to €10,000, per the EU definition).1 Using data from a single bank is 
common practice when detailed data are required (e.g., Adams, Einav, and Levin (2009), Iyer 
and Puri (2012), Berg (2018)). The bank from which we obtain the data is a systemically 
important financial institution, according to the definition of the European Banking Authority 
(EBA).2 The bank operates on a global scale and provides credit to all business types.  
We restrict our sample to small and micro enterprises as defined above because we 
require that loan applicants, whether male or female, are majority owners (own more than 50 
percent) of the firm. We consider all loan types, including working capital loans, real estate 
                                                 
1 A similar dataset is used by Delis et al. (2019). 
2 This includes the EBA definitions for the Global Systemically Important Institutions (G-SIIs) and the Other 





loans, venture loans for startups, lines of credit, and others.3 For our end sample of loan 
applications, we obtain information on several applicant characteristics, including gender, 
income, wealth, education, age, marital status, credit score by the bank, and number of 
dependents. We also have a full array of firm characteristics such as size, leverage, ROA, 
liquidity, and the firm’s region and industry. At the loan level, besides being aware of the bank’s 
credit decision (approved or denied loans), we know the loan amount and maturity applied for, as 
well as  loan characteristics when originated (i.e., whether the loan has performance pricing 
provisions and/or is secured with collateral). Using this information, our sample consists of 
95,340 loan applications between 2002 and 2017. We define all the variables in Table 1. 
[Please insert Table 1 about here]  
Two important sources of available information are the credit score assigned by a bank to 
each applicant, and the exclusivity of the relationship between the applicant and the bank. The 
credit score contains all information (both hard and soft) for the bank’s credit decision. Hard 
information refers here to all the information on paper, i.e., both firm and applicant 
characteristics on the application files (i.e., the relevant variables listed in Tables 1 and 2). Soft 
information refers to the residual, i.e., an explanation for the credit score that is not on paper 
(e.g., the bank’s and loan officer’s perception of the firm, the applicant, and the investment idea; 
the strength of the bank-firm relationship, and other such ties). For a credit score above a given 
cutoff, the bank approves (originates) a loan; for a credit score below this cutoff, the bank denies 
the loan or suggests reexamination at a later date. We are not allowed to expose the precise 
cutoff and thus we normalize it to 0. Thus, in our empirical analysis, the bank originates the loan 
if the credit score is equal to or larger than 0, and the bank denies the loan otherwise.  
                                                 
3 Distinguishing between loan types has no effect on any of our empirical inferences. 
10 
 
Our bank knows exactly which firms apply for loans to other regulated and supervised 
banks (by the EBA or the country’s regulatory and supervisory authority), irrespective of whether 
these firms have had a loan approved or rejected by our bank. Our bank also knows the timing of 
these applications and their outcome and obtains this information from both the firms and the 
country’s credit register. This represents the essence of the exclusive relationship between the 
firms and our bank.4 For small firms, having an exclusive relationship with a bank is fairly common 
and is the case for 65 percent of the firms in our full sample. Using summary statistics from 
previous studies on multiple or exclusive lending relationships, we note that Berger et al. (2011) 
document a 71-percent exclusive relationship between banks and SMEs in three European 
countries (Germany, Italy, and the UK), while this is less often the case in the U.S. (Berger, 
Goulding, and Rice (2014) document a 57-percent rate).5 For most applicants, we observe more 
than one loan application during our sample period. 
 From the 95,340 loan applications and the bank’s continuing information for the 
applicant and firm characteristics, we construct a balanced panel of applicant (firm)-year 
observations. We need to maintain a balanced panel to observe important firm and applicant 
characteristics over the full sample period. We thus discard loans from applicants establishing a 
relationship with the bank in the middle of our period, as well as applicants (both accepted and 
                                                 
4 The bank is naturally unaware of any loan applications to the shadow banking system that was largely unregulated 
during the sample period. In the most comprehensive available report, Kaya and the Deutsche Bank (2014) suggest 
that, in Europe, competition that banks face from shadow banks in SME lending is fairly small (European shadow 
banks usually engage in other activities). Furthermore, even if SMEs access the shadow banking sector, the lending 
terms would be completely different (more unfavorable). Thus, we should exclude shadow bank SME lending from 
our analysis even if we had this information. 
5 It is hard to find much more evidence precisely on whether (small) firms have one or more banking relationship(s) 
in north European countries. Farinha and Santos (2002) report similar statistics for Portugal (70% of firms with fewer 
than 10 employees have one bank relationship). More recently, Bonfim at al. (2018) report a mean value of 2 banks 
for small Portuguese firms, but the Portuguese banking sector is much less concentrated than that in our bank’s 
country. Essentially, the available evidence suggests that the percentage of exclusive relationships in our sample is 
comparable to that in previous papers on relationship banking. 
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rejected) that never reapply for loans. Essentially, all individuals reapply for loans within a four-
year period. In other words, all observed firms have a relationship with the bank from 2004 
onward (the bank has information for applicants from 2002 onward).6  
This panel includes 357,056 observations. The reason the panel has more observations 
than the number of loans is simply that firm owners do not apply for a loan every year. However, 
the bank continues to holds information on applicant characteristics after the loan application 
because a new application takes place in the future and the bank requests information on 
applicants’ income and wealth in the past, which is what allows us to generate the panel of loan 
applicants. For education and marital status, we observe some changes from year to year, and 
when we do not know the precise year of the change (i.e., there is no loan application in two 
consecutive years), we assume that a change occurs in the middle of the time interval between 
the two loan applications. This assumption does not affect our main results. We also fill in the 
observations with the last credit score calculated by the bank. Thus, if there is a loan application 
in year t but not one in year t+1, we assign in year t+1 the credit score in year t.7  
We report summary statistics in Panel A of Table 2. For the applicant and firm 
characteristics, we have a balanced panel of 357,056 applicant (or firm)-year observations and 
95,340 loan applications, from which there are 79,470 originated loans. This number represents 
approximately 83 percent of loan applications and is somewhat lower than that reported in the 
Survey of Access to Finance of Enterprises (SAFE), which also includes the relatively safer 
medium-sized firms. Applications by female entrepreneurs amount to approximately 20 percent 
                                                 
6 This comes at the expense of dropping observations from respective applications that do not fulfill our criteria. 
Running our analysis on an unbalanced sample does not affect our inferences and in fact strengthens the results only 
in the cases where these are statistically significant. However, using an unbalanced panel implies that we do not have 
important dynamic information on certain applicant characteristics (especially income, wealth, and changes in family 
status) and an observed exclusive bank-firm relationship.  
7 Again, sliding this forward to t+2 or t+3, no new loan application in this time interval does not affect our results.  
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of total loan applications. Furthermore, the mean applicant is close to having tertiary education, 
is approximately 44 years old, and has slightly fewer than two dependents.   
[Please insert Table 2 about here] 
 Panels B and C of Table 2 report the equivalent summary statistics separately for female 
and male applicants. The statistical difference is significant for income, wealth, firm size, firm 
leverage, firm cash, and the number of previous loan applications. There is also a significant 
difference in the credit score in favor of male applicants (pointing to a significant gender gap). In 
contrast, the two groups are not statistically different in terms of education, age, number of 
dependents, and (interestingly) firm ROA.  
 We run four checks to establish that the bank and firms in our sample have similar 
characteristics with other systemic European banks and other small European firms, respectively. 
First, we collect Compustat data for the financial statements of the 32 systemically important 
banks (according to the EBA’s definition) for the period 1985-2018. Using these data, we 
compare the annual means of important bank characteristics of these banks with the respective 
characteristics of our bank. Specifically, we use the ratio of liquid assets (cash plus short-term 
securities) to total assets, the ratio of market value to book value, and profitability (before tax 
return on assets). In Figures 1a to 1c, we report scatterplots and regression lines for our bank’s 
values (y-axes) against the systemic banks’ averages (x-axes). The correlations are all positive 
and highly statistically significant (at the one-percent level). Thus, the bank used in our analysis 
has similar characteristics over time with other systemic European banks. 
 We next move to an analysis of credit standards, using data from the SAFE. It is possible 
to compare the Eurozone average rejection rate with that of our bank because we obtain the 
definition of small and micro enterprises and the definition of rejection from the European 
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Union. Figure 2 graphs the eurozone average rejection rate (available for half-years since 2010) 
against the rejection rate from our bank. The correlation for these 19 observations is quite high 
(equal to 0.86) with our bank being somewhat more stringent than the Eurozone average during 
the European crisis (2010-2014) and slightly less stringent from 2015 onward. 
Third, the characteristics of small and micro enterprises in our sample are very similar to 
others in Europe, given that we strictly follow the European definition of small and micro firms. 
Figures 3a and 3b plot the annual average leverage and profitability ratios of small and micro 
firms in several core European countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, and the 
Netherlands) against the averages in our sample. The data for these countries are from Orbis 
(information is only available since 2008). Again, the comparisons reflect important similarities: 
On average, the firms in our sample have a 1.1 percent lower leverage ratio and a 0.76 percent 
higher ROA. These small differences most likely exist because our bank is based in one of the 
highest-income European countries and was not significantly affected by the economic downturn 
of 2010-2014.         
 Fourth, approximately 20 percent of the loan applicants in our sample are female 
entrepreneurs. Females represent 25 percent of the total number of entrepreneurs in our bank, 
which is close to the 29 percent reported for Europe in 2012 (European Commission (2014)). The 
discrepancy probably occurs because our sample begins in 2002, where we report lower 
entrepreneurship rates for females (in 2012, the average in our sample is 28.3 percent). Piacentini 
(2013) suggests that the share of female employers was stable at around 25 percent throughout the 
2000s. Finding equivalent data for loan applications by female entrepreneurs across Europe is a 
big challenge. According to Stefani and Vacca (2013), SAFE data in 2010 shows that 25 percent 
(23 percent) of male (female) entrepreneurs applied for bank loans in the past six months. For the 
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same period, the equivalent statistics in our sample are 27 percent and 24 percent. According to 
Piacentini (2013), about 30 percent of women-led startups use bank credit; in our sample, this 
figure is 34 percent. We also document similar differences in the earnings of female and male 
entrepreneurs with those reported by OECD (2017). All in all, our sample has characteristics 
similar to aggregate data obtained for European countries (especially those with high income 
levels). 
[Please insert Figures 1 - 3 about here] 
 
III. Empirical Analysis 
A. Gender and the Probability of Loan Application 
We first study gender differences in loan-application probability using the full sample of 357,056 
individual-year observations. With this analysis, we aim to examine gender differences related to 
the probability of seeking bank credit, conditional on observed individual and firm 
characteristics. We estimate the following model: 
(1) APPLY𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1GENDER𝑖 + 𝑎2𝑥𝑖(𝑓)𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡,     
where APPLY is a binary variable, taking the value 1 if an individual i in our sample applies for 
a loan at year t (and 0 otherwise),8 GENDER is a binary variable equal to 1 for male applicants 
                                                 
8 Thus, we assign a value 1 to the 95,340 observations for which individuals applied for a loan in a specific year during 
our sample period and a value 0 to the rest of the observations in the sample of 357,056 (individuals in our sample 
who did not apply for a loan in a specific year).The best alternative for a control group is all individuals who do not 
apply (i.e., firms with valuable investment opportunities). Identifying these firms is of course impossible unless there 
are specific demand-side survey data (which have other limitations such as the non-inclusion of credit scores). A more 
viable alternative would be to use all small and micro firms in the country (data from Amadeus or Orbis). However, 
this perplexes identification because bank-firm relationships are not easy to break and firms might choose banks on 
the basis of such relationships, irrespective of other economic incentives. Nevertheless, we run a search in Orbis but 
find only 64 firms in the bank’s country using the EU definition of a maximum turnover of 10 million euros. Using 
larger firms is not an option because most of these are not majority-owned by specific individuals. 
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and equal to 0 for female applicants, and x is a vector of control variables reflecting individual (i) 
or firm (f) characteristics. All specifications include regional and year fixed effects.9 
 An important element of our identification approach is that the credit score not only 
contains information on observed but also on several unobserved characteristics (e.g., soft 
information), which are nonetheless known to the individual and to the bank. This information is 
important because the inclusion of these characteristics within the credit score affects the 
probability of a loan application and should considerably limit the effect of related omitted-
variable bias on GENDER. Thus, the coefficient on GENDER should better capture the relevant 
gender-related reasons behind the probability of applying for a business loan.10 
We report marginal effects from a probit model in column 1 of Table 3. We cluster the 
standard errors in all our analyses by individual applicants.11 In addition to our control variables, 
we also use year and regional dummy variables. We find that female entrepreneurs have a 0.8 
percent lower probability of applying for a loan. While the effect is statistically significant, its 
economic significance is clearly not particularly large. In column 2, we report the equivalent 
results excluding CREDIT_SCORE. The coefficient on GENDER jumps to 2.7 percent, showing 
either that the credit score contains valuable information that is erroneously being attributed to 
gender differences or that the bank discriminates between male and female applicants when 
constructing the credit score. In the next section, we show that the latter is not the case.  
                                                 
9 We also experiment with industry fixed effects. These do not affect the OLS results but introduce convergence 
problems in the probit models. Another level of information that might be important for the formation of the credit 
score and thus the credit decision is the loan officer. Unfortunately, we do not have this information. However, the 
bank notes that, especially for marginal cases, such as those we mostly rely on in our empirical analysis, the ultimate 
credit decision is made at the headquarters by the credit department. For this reason, we also consider relevant 
corporate governance characteristics in robustness tests. 
10 If GENDER were not included in equation (1), CREDIT_SCORE would also capture its effect as part of a soft-
information component. That is, the inclusion of GENDER extracts the relevant information from the more general 
credit-score variable. The same holds for the rest of the controls used in equation (1). 
11 Clustering at a more aggregate level (by region) or double clustering (by individual and year or by region and year) 
does not affect our inferences.   
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[Please insert Table 3 about here] 
 Despite considering the information contained in the credit score, the simple probit model 
may still suffer from the omitted-variable bias, mainly due to population differences in female 
and male entrepreneurs.12 To this end, we use an instrumental-variable (IV) probit model. Our 
instrument is the average (by industry, region, and year) ratio of female to male entrepreneurs 15 
years before the loan application (named AVERAGE_FEMALE_ENTREPRENEURS). For 
example, the value of the ratio in 1987 enters for loans that originated in 2002. The premise for 
the use of this IV is that the local shares of female to male entrepreneurs 15 years ago are 
predetermined and do not directly affect the probability to apply for a loan, conditional on our 
control variables (including the credit score). By using 
AVERAGE_FEMALE_ENTREPRENEURS directly in equation (1), we show that this is the 
case (results in Appendix Table A1), especially when controlling for the applicants’ credit score. 
In contrast, as we show, in the lower part of the tables, that 
AVERAGE_FEMALE_ENTREPRENEURS strongly correlates with GENDER.    
The first-stage results of the two-stage IV probit model in Table 3 indicate a strong 
correlation between AVERAGE_FEMALE_ENTREPRENEURS and APPLY.13 Specifically, a 
one-standard-deviation higher AVERAGE_FEMALE_ENTREPRENEURS  is associated with a 
2.5 percent higher probability that the loan applicant is a female (statistically significant at the 
one-percent level). This is intuitive, given that the pre-existence of more female entrepreneurs in 
a given region, industry, and year yields a higher probability that the loan applicant is a female 
                                                 
12 We are less concerned here with other sources of omitted-variable bias stemming from individual characteristics of 
female vs. male loan applicants (e.g., risk-taking incentives). We precisely leave these differences to be captured by 
GENDER. 
13 Using probit in both stages of the model improves econometric efficiency because the outcome variables in both 
stages are binary. 
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entrepreneur. Importantly, the effect of GENDER on APPLY shows that female entrepreneurs 
have a 1.2 percent lower probability of applying for a loan compared to male entrepreneurs. This 
is our preferred estimate for the rest of our empirical analysis. 
Moreover, in column 4 we use a linear probability model, estimated via OLS. This model 
is preferred in some specifications, especially when using several fixed effects. The results are 
almost identical to those of the first specification. 
An additional robustness test considers the effect of corporate governance characteristics. 
We first add fixed effects based on the head of the bank’s credit department. For borderline 
credit decisions (rejections or approvals), which are the most important for identification 
purposes, loan officers consult the bank’s credit department to make their final decision. Thus, a 
change in the head of the credit department could signal a change in the role of gender. Second, 
we add fixed effects reflecting the addition of a female director to the board. Adding a female 
director might also signal changes in the attitude toward female entrepreneurs. We add these 
fixed effects into our specifications in Table 4 and report the results in specification 1 of 
Appendix Table A2. The results are consistent with our baseline, suggesting that the inclusion of 
these fixed effects do not affect our estimates on gender. 
In a nutshell, our results show that male entrepreneurs display a higher probability of 
applying for credit, implying that male entrepreneurs are either more willing to take credit risks 
or the bank is more willing to supply credit to them. However, the economic significance of this 
finding is not particularly high, showing that the implied probability is between 0.8 percent and 
1.2 percent in our preferred specifications. We next aim to investigate whether the effect is 




B. Probability of Loan Origination and Reapplication 
We examine potential differences in the probability of loan origination for female- and male-
owned firms using the following model: 
(2) GRANTED𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1GENDER𝑖 + 𝑎2𝑥′𝑖(𝑓)𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡.     
In equation (2), GRANTED is a binary variable equal to 1 if the loan is approved by the bank 
(i.e., the credit score is positive) and 0 if the loan application is rejected (i.e., the credit score is 
negative). The rest of the control variables are equivalent to those in equation 1, with the obvious 
exclusion of CREDIT_SCORE that perfectly identifies GRANTED.  
 We estimate equation (2) using the 95,340 observations, where individuals in our sample 
apply for a loan (APPLY = 1), and for which the bank makes a credit decision. Our identification 
approach follows the previous section. However, given that the credit score perfectly defines the 
bank’s credit decision and cannot be included, any omitted-variable bias seems more important 
in equation (2). Thus, we place weight on the results from the IV model.  
 Any significant results in this section would reveal that the bank favors loan applicants 
based on gender. Identifying a positive (negative) and significant coefficient on GENDER 
implies that the bank favors male (female) applicants. Taken together with the findings in the 
previous section and understanding that outright gender discrimination is unlikely for a large 
European bank, a negative coefficient on GENDER is, if anything, the more likely outcome. This 
would imply that the bank observes the higher probability of loan applications by male 
entrepreneurs and is more cautious to originate loans to them given credit-risk considerations. In 
other words, the bank would “price” the higher credit risk of male applicants as soft information 
in the credit score and “discriminate” against male applicants for that reason. 
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 The first specification of Table 4 reports results from the simple probit model. The 
coefficient on GENDER shows that male applicants are 0.5 percent less likely to be granted a 
loan compared to female applicants. Even though this effect is statistically significant at the 10-
percent level, its economic significance is moderate if not small. In column 2, we use the IV 
probit model. Again, in the first stage, the coefficient on 
AVERAGE_FEMALE_ENTREPRENEURS strongly correlates with GENDER. In the second 
stage, we observe that the coefficient on GENDER remains practically unchanged compared to 
specification 1, but the standard error rises to levels that renders the estimate statistically 
insignificant at conventional levels.  
[Please insert Table 4 about here] 
In principle, we should draw similar inferences from models using credit score as the 
outcome variable in equation (2). This implies that we revert to the full sample of 357,055 
observations. The importance of using this sample is that we can also control for the probability 
that an individual actually applies for a loan (APPLICATION_PROBABILITY), which is of 
obvious importance based on our findings in Table 3 that females are less likely to apply. In 
other words, the inability to include APPLICATION_PROBABILITY might be the reason for 
the marginally significant coefficient in column 1 of Table 4. APPLICATION_PROBABILITY 
equals the predicted values of specification 3 in Table 3. We report the results in the last two 
specifications of Table 4 (OLS and two-stage least squares (2SLS), respectively). The results 
from both the OLS and the 2SLS specifications show that gender does not explain the credit 
score. Thus, APPLICATION_PROBABILITY is indeed an omitted variable in the estimation of 




As an additional test, we also examine differences in the loan amount and spread. The 
results in Table 5, especially those from 2SLS, suggest that the effect of GENDER is statistically 
insignificant. Furthermore, using fixed effects reflecting changes in the head of credit department 
or the addition of female directors to the bank’s board does not affect the results in this section 
(see specifications 2 to 4 in Appendix Table A2). 
Our results are in line with recent evidence by Dobbie et al. (2018), who study consumer 
lending using administrative data from a high-cost lender in the United Kingdom and with Delis 
and Papadopoulos (2018), who study mortgage loans. Our findings are contrary to the majority 
of studies on small-business lending (Muravyev et al., 2009; Bellucci et al., 2010; Ongena and 
Popov, 2016), who typically use data from several countries. Thus, we find that it is important to 
have detailed loan-level data with important individual characteristics to examine gender 
discrimination in small business lending. We conclude that the effect of gender is statistically 
insignificant either in the probability of loan origination or the main loan terms (loan amount and 
spreads).  
[Please insert Table 5 about here] 
 Consistent with our results in Table 3, we next look into gender differences concerning 
the probability that rejected applicants reapply for a loan within a specific time period (one or 
two years).14 We expect that within the sample of rejected applicants, and given that male 
applicants have a higher probability of applying for a loan in the general sample, the effect of 
GENDER would be more potent. That is, rejected male applicants will seek to reapply for a loan 
sooner than will rejected female applicants. To examine this premise, we construct the dummy 
variable REAPPLY, which takes the value 1 for rejected applicants who reapplied for a loan 
                                                 
14 To be included in the balanced panel, all these individuals reapply for loans within a period of four years. 
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within one or two years after the bank’s credit decision (takes the value 0 for those who did not 
reapply).15     
 For this exercise, we use the sample of rejected applicants (15,826 observations) and 
report the results in Table 6. The first two columns report probit estimations and specifications 3 
and 4 report IV probit estimations.16 We use a one-year window in columns 1 and 3, and a two-
year window in columns 2 and 4. The results show a considerably higher probability that male 
applicants reapply within one or two years after a rejected application. Specifically, based on the 
IV estimates, we find that rejected male applicants are three percent more likely to apply for a 
loan in the one-year window after the original rejection. This likelihood increases to 4.2 percent 
in the two-year window. These probabilities are higher than those identified in Table 3 and 
reflect the comparative readiness (cautiousness) of male (female) applicants to reapply for credit. 
We view this line of results as particularly important for the subsequent empirical analysis.17    
[Please insert Table 6 about here] 
 
C. Gender and Firm Outcomes 
Noting that male entrepreneurs are somewhat more likely to apply for a loan and that the bank 
does not discriminate based on gender, the most interesting question becomes whether gender 
affects firm outcomes via the credit channel. We first look into the probability that a firm 
defaults in the period following the loan origination, using the following model: 
                                                 
15 We also know that those applicants did not reapply for credit to another bank (at least at banks being actively 
regulated and supervised by national or European authorities). 
16 An alternative would be to estimate duration models (e.g., Cox hazard models). We do not favor this approach here 
because, by construction of our panel to observe important applicant characteristics, individuals reapply for loans 
within four years. Thus, we document gender differences in the readiness to apply for credit within the first two years 
post-rejection. 
17 Again, our results are robust to the inclusion of corporate governance fixed effects (specification 5 of Table A2). 
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(3) DEFAULT𝑖,𝑡+𝑛 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1GENDER𝑖 + 𝑎2𝑥′𝑖(𝑓)𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡,     
where the outcome variable is a dummy equal to 1 when a firm defaults within n years after the 
current year (and 0 otherwise).  
 We begin by using the full sample of 357,055 observations and again explicitly control 
for the APPLICATION_PROBABILITY and the CREDIT_SCORE. Of course, these variables 
do not exhaustively control for omitted-variable bias in this case (as in equation (1)) because the 
bank cannot perfectly foresee a nonperforming loan. Thus, simple probit or OLS models might 
be biased; nevertheless, we report them in columns 1 and 3 of Table 7 for comparability 
purposes. The probit (OLS) results show that a firm default is 1.3 percent (1.4 percent) more 
probable among male applicants (results statistically significant at the one-percent level). 
Moving to the more reliable IV probit results (column 2 of Table 7), we observe an increase in 
our estimated probability to two percent. Notably, despite the use of instrumentation, the 
standard error is not significantly higher, making the IV probit model our preferred one. The 
equivalent 2SLS estimate (in column 4) is even higher, but the standard error also significantly 
increases, displaying econometric inefficiency.18 
[Please insert Table 7 about here] 
 To pinpoint gender differences in the probability of firm default, we next use only those 
observations for which there is a loan application, as the bank’s credit decision might be an 
important factor in firm default. We report the results in Table 8. We use all control variables of 
the previous estimations, but do not report the estimates from this point onward (results are 
available on request). We first show marginal effects from the four combinations of GRANTED 
and GENDER. The first two specifications include the interaction term GRANTED × GENDER  
                                                 




(along with the main terms), while specifications 3 and 4 also include the triple term GRANTED 
× GENDER × CREDIT_SCORE (along with the relevant main and double terms). The latter 
approach offers additional information on possible heterogeneity on our results due to the credit 
score.  
[Please insert Table 8 about here] 
 The results in column 1 indeed show that when the loan is not granted (i.e., when 
GRANTED = 0), the probability of default is higher for both female and male applicants. The 
results in column 2 show that this effect is lower when we control for the credit score and also 
within a triple interaction term. This is intuitive, given the information in the credit score for the 
applicant’s quality. The difference in the effect of GENDER when GRANTED = 0 is generally 
statistically insignificant, with coefficient estimates essentially being equal when we control for 
the triple term in columns 2 and 4 (probit and OLS models, respectively). Interestingly, this is 
not the case when GRANTED = 1. According to column 2, we observe a 1.7 percent difference 
between male applicants (whose probability of firm default is 2.3 percent) and female applicants 
(whose probability of firm default is only 0.6 percent).  
 We essentially confirm these effects by estimating an IV probit model for the average 
effect of gender on the probability of firm default (column 5 of Table 8). The first stage of the 
model again shows that the effect of AVERAGE_FEMALE_ENTREPRENEURS is highly 
statistically and economically significant. The second-stage results show that male applicants are 
2.1 percent more likely to experience their firms’ default, an effect statistically significant at the 
five-percent level. This effect is also quite strong economically, considering that apart from 
income, wealth, and education, no other control variable reflecting individual characteristics has 
a higher marginal effect.     
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 The second important question concerns measures of firm profitability and leverage three 
years after the bank’s credit decision. This is the most important outcome we are considering in 
terms of the role of the bank’s credit decision in the gender-firm performance nexus. To this end, 
in the same fashion with equations (1)-(3), we estimate the following model: 
(4)     FORWARD ROA (LEVERAGE)𝑖,𝑡+3 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1GENDER𝑖 + 𝑎2𝑥′𝑖(𝑓)𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡,   
where FORWARD_ROA or FORWARD_LEVERAGE is observed three years after the bank’s 
credit decision (i.e., at t+3).  
 The OLS results are in Table 9. Similar to Table 8, we report results for the four 
combinations of interaction between GRANTED and GENDER. We observe that when the 
bank’s credit decision is negative, the effect of GENDER on both FORWARD_ROA and 
FORWARD_LEVERAGE is statistically and economically similar. The respective effects when 
GRANTED = 1 is statistically different when comparing male and female entrepreneurs. 
Specifically, based on our preferred estimates in column 2 (probit model including the triple term 
with CREDIT_SCORE), the firms of male borrowers have a 1.4 points higher 
FORWARD_ROA compared to firms of female borrowers. This comes at the cost of higher 
FORWARD_LEVERAGE for the firms of male borrowers (0.209 vs. 0.195 of female 
borrowers).    
[Please insert Table 9 about here] 
 The results in Tables 7 to 9 might be due to the omitted-variable bias more than to the 
respective results in previous tables (which also include IV methods), because the credit score 
cannot contain adequate information about future firm outcomes, i.e., no bank has perfect 
foresight on future firm outcomes. Furthermore, the IV used in the previous estimations might 
not be as suitable in the context of forward ROA models because future profitability is a function 
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of many current and future developments that might be correlated with regional dynamics in the 
three years from application to forward ROA materialization.  
A solution to this important identification problem comes from the dichotomy between 
the estimation results when GRANTED =1 vs. GRANTED = 0, which implies that the bank’s 
credit decision and the underlying credit score (which is strictly used to reach this decision) 
create a sharp RDD (see also Berg, 2018). The theoretical reason is straightforward: A positive 
credit decision helps firms generate liquidity and investment, increase their future profitability, 
and lower the future probability of default. We validate this theoretical assertion with several 
empirical tests. 
 In our context, we need to examine the heterogeneous effect of granting a loan by gender. 
Using an RDD with interaction terms to infer heterogeneous effects is not common practice in 
the related literature. Therefore, we mostly rely for identification of the effect of gender on future 
firm outcomes to the estimation of equation (4) separately for female and male entrepreneurs.19 
The credit score is the assignment (also referred to as “the running” or “the forcing”) variable 
(Imbens and Lemieux, 2008; Lee and Lemieux, 2010). Also following the literature, we use a 
nonparametric local linear regression, which has the advantage of assigning higher weights to 
observations closer to the cutoff value of zero.20 We determine the optimal bandwidth using the 
                                                 
19 In general, the advantage of using two separate regressions is that the slopes of all the right-hand side variables are 
allowed to differ and this might be preferable when these variables have largely different correlations by gender. In 
contrast, the advantage of the model with interaction terms is using information from the full sample once. In our 
context, the two separate regressions have another important advantage. The “rdrobust” Stata tools by Calonico et al. 
(2014), Cattaneo et al. (2016), Calonico et al. (2018), Cattaneo et al. (2018), and related papers allow identifying the 
validity of the RDD and produce robust estimates. These imply improved inference and associated transparency. 
However, these tools come at the expense of some flexibility loss, especially as we cannot introduce the interaction 
term GRANTED × GENDER. In the technically most relevant recent study, Berg (2018) uses a local linear regression 
and more standard software allowing the regression function to differ on both sides of the cutoff point (see also Lee 
and Lemieux, 2010,  p. 318). This is different from our specification, where we opt to examine heterogeneous effects 
by GENDER. When comparing estimates without an interaction term between standard Stata packages and the 
packages by Calonico et al., we find them to be essentially the same.  
20 In contrast, a parametric OLS regression places an equal weight to all observations.  
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approach in Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014), and for efficient estimation we base our 
inference on the local-quadratic bias-correction in Calonico, Cattaneo, and Farrell (2018) and 
Cattaneo, Jansson, and Ma (2018).  
In Figures 4 and 5, we provide a graphical representation of the relation between the 
credit score and our outcome variables for the full sample of loan applicants (i.e., APPLY = 1), 
as well as for the separate samples of male and female applicants. The points represent local 
sample means of the applicant’s income for a set of disjointed bins of control and treatment units 
spanning the full sample. We select evenly spaced bins that mimic the underlying variability of 
the data using spacings estimators. The continuous line represents a fourth-order polynomial fit 
used to approximate the conditional mean of applicants’ income below and above the cutoff. All 
the figures show clear upward shifts in both FORWARD_ROA and FORWARD_LEVERAGE 
around the cutoff. This indeed shows that the treatment (GRANTED = 1) entails a sharp 
discontinuity in both the outcome variables for the full sample and for the separate samples of 
male and female applicants. In addition, the relations reflect nonlinearity, which is more 
pronounced for female applicants and for FORWARD_LEVERAGE. In that sense, the local 
linear regression helps with identification, as the family of nonparametric models is better suited 
to account for nonlinearity. 
[Please insert Figures 4 & 5 about here] 
The key assumption for the validity of the RDD is that applicants cannot precisely 
manipulate their credit score (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). Manipulation of the credit score is 
difficult to achieve consistently and precisely, assuming that the bank is a value-maximizing 
entity aiming to minimize nonperforming loans. In Figure 6, we run a manipulation test proposed 
by Cattaneo et al. (2018). The test uses the local quadratic estimator with cubic bias-correction 
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and a triangular kernel. In line with our theoretical priors, the formal test confirms there is no 
statistical evidence of manipulation of the assignment variable. In the Appendix, we also provide 
additional evidence for the validity of our RDD. Specifically, we show that the distribution of the 
credit score does not jump around the cutoff (Figure A1). A second assumption on RDD validity 
is that our control variables are not discontinuous at the cutoff and we indeed find this to be the 
case (figures available on request). 
[Please insert Figure 6 about here] 
 Following the validity tests, we report our baseline RDD results in Table 10. We report 
the bias-corrected RD estimates with conventional variance estimator. The equivalent results 
with a robust variance estimator are almost the same. For the estimation, the specific RDD 
method uses a specific number of observations right and left of the cutoff (reported as effective 
observations in Table 10); this also implies that the approach is quite less sensitive to difference 
in the sample size between male and females. The estimate in column 1 suggests that a positive 
credit decision lowers the probability of firm default for female applicants by a substantial 18.9 
percent. The equivalent estimate for male applicants in column 4 is 25.9 percent. This 7 percent 
difference is statistically significant at the one-percent level and suggests that male applicants 
rely on a loan origination to avert their firms’ default much more than do female applicants. This 
finding is consistent with the more risk-averse behavior of female entrepreneurs, which is also 
uncovered in their lower probability of applying for credit, and their generally lower default 
rates, as shown in Tables 7 and 8.   
 The corresponding effects on FORWARD_ROA and FORWARD_LEVERAGE are 
more indicative of our overall findings. The higher leverage assumed by male applicants and the 
corresponding higher probability of default trade off the higher average future ROA. 
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Specifically, we find that a positive credit decision increases FORWARD_ROA of the firms by 
male entrepreneurs by 0.011 more than the corresponding increase of female entrepreneurs. This 
is a large difference given the mean average ROA of 0.068 (0.082) for female-owned firms in 
our sample. Phrased differently, for female-owned firms, a positive credit decision by the bank 
increases a firm’s return on assets (ROA) three years onward by approximately 29 percent 
(compared to the average ROA of female-owned firms). For the male-owned firms, the 
equivalent increase is approximately 38 percent. 
 Is this profitability difference really the result of the propensity of male entrepreneurs to 
reapply for loans more frequently and take on higher leverage and probability of default? To 
answer this question, we repeat our analysis in columns 2 and 4 of Table 10, this time including 
APPLICATION_PROBABILITY and DEFAULT_PROBABILITY (as estimated from the 
prediction of specification 2, Table 7). We report the results in Table 11. We note that the effect 
of the bank’s credit decision on the increase in FORWARD_ROA of female applicants is almost 
the same with that in Table 10. However, the equivalent response for male applicants is 
significantly lower and converges to the estimate of females.21 This analysis essentially implies 
that the higher ROA observed for firms owned by male entrepreneurs is predominantly due to 
their propensity to apply for credit somewhat more easily and the associated increase in 
investment. This advantage comes, however, at the expense of a limited number of male-owned 
firms defaulting on their higher leverage.             
[Please insert Table 11 about here] 
 
IV. Conclusions and Directions for Future Research 
                                                 
21 Sequentially introducing the application and the default probability in our model shows that they contribute to this 
decline with an almost equal weight.  
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We use a unique sample of loan applications to a single bank, which provides all available 
information on applicants, their credit score, the resultant loans, and the involved firms. The 
applications are for corporate loans by majority owners of small and micro enterprises. This 
dataset allows a deep examination of the differential role of credit, from application to 
origination, on the performance of female- and male-owned firms. 
 We find a sequence of results following the loan application. First, males apply for loans 
more easily; however, after controlling for the credit score, the effect is economically moderate 
(1.2 percent higher probability for male entrepreneurs in our preferred specification). Second, 
after controlling for the differential probability between genders in the loan application, we find 
no significant gender gap in the probability of loan origination or in the loan amount and spread. 
 Subsequently, we examine the role of credit and its origination (or not) in the nexus 
between gender and future firm outcomes (three year after the bank’s credit decision). We find 
that male-owned firms indeed have higher leverage three years after the bank’s credit decision 
and this excess leverage contributes to somewhat higher default probability for their firms. 
However, male-owned firms also have higher returns on assets three years after the bank’ credit 
decision. We show that this performance gap is mainly shaped by the tendency of male 
entrepreneurs to apply for credit more easily (higher demand) compared to female entrepreneurs. 
 The natural extension to our analysis and findings is to analyze more deeply the reasons 
behind the moderately higher credit demand by male entrepreneurs. The entrepreneurship 
literature proposes that any differences between genders in credit risk-taking and financial 
motivation (deviation from pure profit maximization) emanates from the propensity of female 
entrepreneurs to demand work autonomy (be self-employed and decide on their labor supply) 
and be risk-averse, especially when they are married and have children. Given our results that 
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credit origination is the key element affecting the gender-related performance gap, further 
analyzing the precise reasons behind the higher demand for credit by male entrepreneurs implies 
better understanding of this gap, which is especially important given our finding that male 
applicants more readily reapply for loans after being rejected. As our analysis already covers 
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Table 1. Data and Variable Definitions 
Variable  Description 
  
A. Dimension of the data  
Individuals Loan applicants who have an exclusive relationship with the bank and are majority owners 
(own more than 50%) of a firm. These borrowers apply to the bank for one or more business 
loans during the period 2002-2016 and the loan is either originated or denied. Due to the 
exclusive relationship, the bank holds information on the applicants even outside the year of 
loan application. 
 
Year The years covering the period 2002-2017. Applications end in 2016 and we use one more year 





Apply A dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual applied for a loan in a given year and 0 
otherwise. 
 
Gender A dummy variable equal to 1 if the applicant is a male and 0 otherwise.  
Income The euro amount of individuals’ total annual income (in log).  
Wealth The euro amount of individuals’ total wealth other than the assets of the firm and minus total 
debt (in log). 
 
Education An ordinal variable ranging between 0 and 5 if the individual completed the following 
education. 0: No secondary; 1: Secondary; 2: Post-secondary, non-tertiary; 3: Tertiary; 4: 
MSc, PhD or MBA.  
Age The applicant’s age. 
Marital status A dummy variable equal to 1 if the applicant is married and 0 otherwise. 
Dependents The number of dependents. 
Firm size Total firm’s assets (in log). 
Firm leverage The ratio of firm’s total debt to total assets.  
Firm ROA The ratio of firm’s after-tax profits to total assets. 
Firm cash The ratio of cash holdings to total assets. 
Forward ROA The mean FIRM_ROA in the three years after the year of the loan application. 
Forward growth The mean increase in FIRM_SIZE in the three years after the year of the loan application. 
Forward leverage The mean FIRM_LEVERAGE in the three years after the year of the loan application. 
Credit score The credit score of the applicant, as calculated by the bank. There is a 0 cutoff: positive values 
indicate that the loan is approved and negative values indicate that the loan is denied. 
Applications The number of applications to the same bank before the current loan application. 
Granted A dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan is originated (Credit score>0) and 0 otherwise (Credit 
score<0). 
Default A dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm defaults and 0 otherwise. 
Loan amount  Log of the loan facility amount in thousands of euros. 
Loan spread The difference between the loan rate and the LIBOR (in basis points). 
Maturity  Loan maturity in months. 
Loan provisions A dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan has performance pricing provisions and 0 otherwise. 
Collateral A dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan has collateral guarantees and 0 otherwise. 
Average female 
entrepreneurs 
The share of female entrepreneurs to total entrepreneurs by region, industry, and year, 15 
years before the loan application. 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics 
The table reports the number of observations, mean, standard deviation, minimum, and 
maximum for the variables use in the empirical analysis. The variables are defined in Table 
1.  
 Obs. Mean St. dev. Min. Max. 
Panel A: Full sample  
Apply 357,056 0.267 0.442 0 1 
Gender 357,056 0.802 0.379 0 1 
Income 357,056 10.94 0.428 9.738 12.78 
Wealth 357,055 12.07 0.615 7.481 14.29 
Education 357,056 2.723 1.015 0 5 
Age 357,056 43.95 15.86 21 76 
Marital status 357,056 0.573 0.484 0 1 
Dependents 357,056 1.851 1.472 0 7 
Firm size 357,055 12.89 0.430 10.18 14.39 
Leverage 357,055 0.206 0.125 0.126 0.831 
ROA 357,056 0.079 0.100 -0.409 0.579 
Cash 357,056 0.080 0.032 0.066 0.255 
Credit score 357,056 0.637 0.603 -0.773 3.500 
Applications 357,056 6.813 2.474 1 9 
Granted 95,340 0.834 0.372 0 1 
Default 357,056 0.020 0.094 0 1 
Loan amount  95,340 3.546 2.008 0.703 10.96 
Loan spread 79,470 338.3 245.8 33.45 985.7 
Maturity  95,340 46.6 37.07 4 271 
Loan provisions 79,470 0.396 0.456 0 1 
Collateral 79,470 0.692 0.488 0 1 
Av. female entrepreneurs 357,056 0.197 0.045 0.036 0.300 
Application probability 357,056 0.267 0.015 0.146 0.603 
Panel B: Female applicants (Gender = 0) 
Income 62,033 10.80 0.418 9.738 12.55 
Wealth 62,032 11.88 0.630 7.554 14.23 
Education 62,033 2.713 1.003 0 5 
Firm size 62,032 12.40 0.416 10.62 14.32 
Leverage 62,032 0.189 0.024 0 0.761 
ROA 62,033 0.068 0.088 -0.218 0.497 
Cash 62,033 0.072 0.013 0.070 0.255 
Apply 62,033 0.255 0.438 0 1 
Granted 16,097 0.853 0.379 0 1 
Age 62,033 42.88 15.20 24 70 
Dependents 62,033 1.737 1.288 0 4 
Credit score 62,033 0.655 0.511 -0.629 3.500 
Applications 62,033 5.128 1.485 1 8 
Default 62,033 0.018 0.078 0 1 
Loan amount  16,097 3.379 1.987 0.717 10.12 
Loan spread 13,370 325.1 230.3 37.20 852.5 
Maturity  16,097 44.8 36.85 9 264 
Loan provisions 13,370 0.368 0.460 0 1 
Collateral 13,370 0.661 0.455 0 1 
Panel C: Male applicants (Gender = 1) 
Income 295,023 11.01 0.426 9.818 12.78 
Wealth 295,023 12.13 0.612 7.481 14.29 
Education 295,023 2.729 1.011 0 5 
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Firm size 295,023 13.01 0.429 10.18 14.39 
Leverage 295,023 0.215 0.075 0 0.831 
ROA 295,023 0.082 0.093 -0.349 0.579 
Cash 295,023 0.082 0.044 0.0661 0.254 
Apply 295,023 0.277 0.443 0 1 
Granted 79,243 0.827 0.368 0 1 
Age 295,023 44.11 15.99 21 76 
Dependents 295,023 1.889 1.429 0 7 
Credit score 295,023 0.649 0.603 -0.773 3.500 
Applications 295,023 6.215 1.474 1 9 
Default 295,023 0.021 0.097 0 1 
Loan amount  79,243 3.594 1.997 0.703 10.96 
Loan spread 66,100 353.9 246.4 33.45 985.7 
Maturity  79,243 47.4 37.12 4 271 
Loan provisions 66,100 0.418 0.446 0 1 
Collateral 66,100 0.710 0.475 0 1 
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Table 3. Probability of Loan Application 
The table reports marginal effects and standard errors clustered by individual (in 
parentheses) from the estimation of the probability that individuals apply for a loan 
during our sample period. Dependent variable is the binary variable APPLY, and all 
variables are defined in Table 1. Specifications 1 and 2 are estimated using a probit 
model, specification 3 using a two-stage IV probit model (probit in both stages), and 
specification 4 with OLS. AVERAGE_FEMALE_ENTREPRENEURS is the 
instrumental variable for GENDER in specification 3 and its effect in the first stage is 
given after the second-stage results. The lower part of the table denotes the fixed 
effects, number of observations, and adjusted R-squared (if applicable). The ***, **, 
and * marks denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.  
  1 2 3 4 
Dependent variable: Apply Apply Apply Apply 
Income 0.030*** 0.036*** 0.032*** 0.030*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) 
Wealth -0.001 0.002* -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Education 0.024*** 0.038*** 0.025*** 0.022*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) 
Age 0.000 0.003*** 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Dependents 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) 
Firm size 0.001 0.007*** 0.001 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Leverage 0.285*** 0.389*** 0.285*** 0.299*** 
 (0.032) (0.041) (0.032) (0.034) 
ROA 0.024** 0.028*** 0.025** 0.024** 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010) 
Cash -0.978*** -1.822*** -0.975*** -0.942*** 
 (0.358) (0.406) (0.360) (0.327) 
Applications 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Credit score 0.298***  0.293*** 0.260*** 
 (0.029)  (0.031) (0.032) 
Gender 0.008*** 0.027*** 0.012*** 0.008*** 
 (0.002)  (0.004) (0.002) 
 
First-stage results     
Av. female entrepreneurs   0.546***  
   (0.055)  
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes Yes 
Regional fixed effects Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 357,055  357,055 357,055 
R-squared      0.712 
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Table 4. Probability of Loan Origination 
The first two specifications report marginal effects and standard errors clustered by 
individual (in parentheses) from the estimation of the probability that a loan is originated 
(against the probability that the loan is denied). The last two specifications report 
coefficient estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) of a credit score equation. 
Dependent variable in the first two specifications is the binary variable GRANTED and in 
the last two specifications the variable CREDIT_SCORE; all variables are defined in Table 
1. Specification 1 is estimated using a probit model, specification 2 using a two-stage IV 
probit model (probit in both stages), specification 3 with OLS and specification 4 with 
2SLS. AVERAGE_FEMALE_ENTREPRENEURS is the instrumental variable for 
GENDER in specifications 2 and 4 and its effect in the first stage is given after the second-
stage results. The lower part of the table denotes the fixed effects, number of observations, 
and adjusted R-squared (if applicable). The ***, **, and * marks denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
  1 2 3 4 
Dependent variable: Granted Granted Credit score Credit score 
Income 0.262*** 0.268*** 0.627*** 0.632*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) 
Wealth 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Education 0.023** 0.025** 0.025** 0.027** 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) 
Age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Dependents 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Firm size -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Leverage -0.147*** -0.147*** -0.405*** -0.395*** 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.039) (0.040) 
ROA 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.113*** 0.111*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.012) (0.013) 
Cash 0.760** 0.765** 1.099*** 1.239*** 
 (0.312) (0.315) (0.423) (0.449) 
Applications 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.053*** 0.053*** 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) 
Application probability   4.110*** 4.126*** 
   (1.320) (1.355) 
Gender -0.005* -0.005 -0.027 -0.035 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.040) (0.045) 
 
First-stage results     
Av. female entrepreneurs  0.274***  0.182*** 
  (0.071)  (0.033) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 95,340 95,340 357,055 357,055 
R-squared     0.616  
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Table 5. Loan Amount and Spread 
The table reports coefficient estimates and standard errors clustered by individual 
(in parentheses) from the estimation of loan amount (first two specifications) and 
loan spread (latter two specifications) equations. Results are obtained from the 
sample of originated loans. The dependent variable is noted on the first line of 
table; all variables are defined in Table 1. Specifications 1 and 3 are estimated 
using OLS; specifications 2 and 4 are estimated using 2SLS. The lower part of the 
table denotes the rest of the control variables (same as in Table 3), fixed effects, 
number of observations, and adjusted R-squared (if applicable). The ***, **, and * 
marks denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 











Gender 0.064* 0.060 -1.248 -1.828 
 (0.034) (0.039) (1.432) (2.689) 
Maturity 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.478*** 0.489*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.092) (0.105) 
Loan provisions 0.243*** 0.250*** -22.310*** -22.755*** 
 (0.051) (0.056) (3.109) (3.188) 
Collateral 0.020 0.021 -4.060 -4.048 
 (0.014) (0.015) (3.103) (3.119) 
Loan amount   -5.241*** -5.170*** 
   (1.125) (1.239) 
Loan spread -0.003*** -0.003***   
 (0.000) (0.000)   
 
First-stage results     
Av. female entrepreneurs  0.287***  0.278*** 
  (0.099)  (0.097) 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 79,470 79,470 79,470 79,470 
R-squared 0.855 0.693 0.858 0.834 
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Table 6. Probability of Reapplication after Rejection 
The table reports marginal effects and standard errors clustered by individual (in 
parentheses) from the estimation of the probability that individuals reapply for a 
loan after facing a rejection from the bank. Dependent variable is the binary 
variable REAPPLY, which takes the value 1 when rejected applicants reapply 
within a specific time frame (and 0 otherwise). All variables are defined in Table 1. 
Specifications 1 and 2 are estimated using a probit model and Reapply referring to 
a one-year and two-year periods, respectively; specifications 3 and 4 report the 
equivalent results using a two-stage IV probit model (probit in both stages). 
AVERAGE_FEMALE_ENTREPRENEURS is the instrumental variable for 
GENDER in specifications 3 and 4, and its effect in the first stage is given after the 
second-stage results. The lower part of the table denotes the fixed effects, number 
of observations, and adjusted R-squared (if applicable). The ***, **, and * marks 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.  











Income 0.035*** 0.032*** 0.034*** 0.035*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) 
Wealth 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Education 0.017** 0.021*** 0.025** 0.027*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) 
Age 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Dependents 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Firm size 0.004** 0.006*** 0.005** 0.009*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Leverage 0.311*** 0.328*** 0.403*** 0.400*** 
 (0.068) (0.076) (0.088) (0.093) 
ROA 0.020* 0.032** 0.035** 0.038** 
 (0.011) (0.014) (0.013) (0.016) 
Cash -0.860*** -0.822*** -0.983*** -0.992*** 
 (0.229) (0.206) (0.237) (0.247) 
Applications 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Credit score 0.401*** 0.411*** 0.393*** 0.407*** 
 (0.049) (0.052) (0.047) (0.052) 
Gender 0.027** 0.035** 0.030** 0.042** 
 (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) 
 
First-stage results     
Av. female entrepreneurs   0.447*** 0.447*** 
   (0.083) (0.083) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 15,826 15,826 15,826 15,826 
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Table 7. Probability of Firm Default in the General Sample 
The table reports marginal effects and standard errors clustered by individual (in parentheses) 
from the estimation of the probability that a firm defaults using our full sample. Dependent 
variable is the binary variable DEFAULT; all variables are defined in Table 1. Specification 1 is 
estimated using a probit model, specification 2 using a two-stage IV probit model (probit in both 
stages), specification 3 with OLS and specification 4 with 2SLS. 
AVERAGE_FEMALE_ENTREPRENEURS is the instrumental variable for GENDER in 
specifications 2 and 4 and its effect in the first stage is given after the second-stage results. The 
lower part of the table denotes the fixed effects, number of observations, and adjusted R-squared 
(if applicable). The ***, **, and * marks denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels. 
  1 2 3 4 
Dependent variable: Default Default Default Default 
Income -0.009 -0.009 -0.015** -0.018 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.007) (0.014) 
Wealth -0.015** -0.016** -0.025*** -0.026*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) 
Education -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.012*** -0.012*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
Age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Dependents -0.002 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) 
Firm size -0.003 -0.003 -0.005 -0.006 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) 
Leverage 0.154*** 0.153*** 0.199*** 0.202*** 
 (0.025) (0.027) (0.033) (0.043) 
ROA -0.216*** -0.223*** -0.218*** -0.219*** 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.022) (0.022) 
Cash -0.350*** -0.339*** -0.453*** -0.402*** 
 (0.100) (0.101) (0.141) (0.154) 
Applications -0.001** -0.001** -0.002*** -0.001** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Application probability -0.123* -0.128* -0.139* -0.145* 
 (0.069) (0.072) (0.075) (0.082) 
Credit score -0.141*** -0.148*** -0.155*** -0.152*** 
 (0.022) (0.031) (0.025) (0.037) 
Gender 0.013*** 0.020*** 0.014*** 0.025** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.011) 
 
First-stage results     
Av. female entrepreneurs  0.340***  0.207*** 
  (0.052)  (0.040) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 357,055 357,055 357,055 357,055 
R-squared     0.513   
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Table 8. Probability of Firm Default when Individuals Apply for a Loan 
The table reports marginal effects for GRANTED × GENDER (all four combinations) from the estimation of the 
probability that a firm defaults. Results are obtained from the full sample (aka balanced panel of individuals irrespective 
of whether there is a loan application). Dependent variable is the binary variable DEFAULT; all variables are defined in 
Table 1. Specification 1 is estimated using a probit model, and includes the interaction term GRANTED × GENDER 
(along with the relevant main terms) and CREDIT_SCORE as a control variable. Specification 2 is estimated using a 
probit model and includes the interaction term GRANTED × GENDER × CREDIT_SCORE (along with the relevant 
main terms and double interactions). Specifications 3 and 4 replicate the first two specifications, respectively, but are 
estimated with OLS. Specification 5 is estimated using a two-stage IV probit model (probit in both stages), with 
AVERAGE_FEMALE_ENTREPRENEURS being the instrumental variable. The lower part of the table denotes the 
control variables (same as in Table 3), fixed effects, number of observations, and adjusted R-squared (if applicable). The 
***, **, and * marks denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
  1 2 3 4 5 
Dependent variable: Default Default Default Default Default 
Granted=0 x Gender=0 0.038*** 0.023** 0.040*** 0.026**  
 (0.004) (0.025) (0.004) (0.022)  
Granted=0 x Gender=1 0.043*** 0.024*** 0.045*** 0.025**  
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.022)  
Granted=1 x Gender=0 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.008***  
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  
Granted=1 x Gender=1 0.025*** 0.023*** 0.025*** 0.025***  
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  
Gender     0.021** 
     (0.012) 
 
First-stage results      
Av. female entrepreneurs     0.293*** 
     (0.105) 
Control variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 95,340 95,340 95,340 95,340 95,340 
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Table 9. Credit Decision, Gender, and Future Firm Outcomes: Parametric 
Results 
The table reports marginal effects for GRANTED × GENDER (all four combinations) from the 
estimation of the probability that a firm defaults. Results are obtained from the full sample (aka 
balanced panel of individuals irrespective of whether there is a loan application). The dependent 
variable is noted on the first line of table; all variables are defined in Table 1. Specifications 1 
and 3 are estimated using OLS, and include the interaction term GRANTED × GENDER (along 
with the relevant main terms) and CREDIT_SCORE as a control variable. Specifications 2 and 
4 are estimated using OLS and include the interaction term GRANTED × GENDER × 
CREDIT_SCORE (along with the relevant main terms and double interactions). The lower part 
of the table denotes the control variables (same as in Table 3), fixed effects, number of 
observations, and adjusted R-squared (if applicable). The ***, **, and * marks denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
  1 2 3 4 








Granted=0 x Gender=0 0.041*** 0.036*** 0.164*** 0.160*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Granted=0 x Gender=1 0.040*** 0.037*** 0.190*** 0.188*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Granted=1 x Gender=0 0.073*** 0.070*** 0.195*** 0.195*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Granted=1 x Gender=1 0.084*** 0.084*** 0.211*** 0.209*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Control variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 82,119 82,119 82,119 82,119 
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Table 10. Credit Decision, Gender, and Future Firm Outcomes: Nonparametric 
Results 
The table reports coefficients and standard errors clustered by individual (in parentheses). The dependent 
variable is given in the first row of the table and all variables are defined in Table 1. Estimation method is the 
local linear regression with triangular kernel. For each specification, we report the bias-corrected RD 
estimates with robust variance estimator. The *** and ** marks denote statistical significance at the 1% and 
5% levels. Obs. is the original number of observations. Effective obs. are the effective number of observations 
(determined by the bandwidth) left and right of the cutoff. BW estimate is the estimate of the bandwidth and 
BW bias is the associated bias. The bandwidth selection procedure is the one proposed by Calonico et al. 
(2014). The bias-corrected RD estimator and the robust variance estimator are obtained according to Calonico 
et al. (2018) and Calonico at el. (2014), respectively. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
 Female applicants Male applicants 












Granted -0.189*** 0.020*** 0.009* -0.259*** 0.031*** 0.028*** 
 (0.043) (0.005) (0.005) (0.054) (0.006) (0.006) 
Control variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 16,097 16,097 16,097 79,243 79,243 79,243 
Eff. obs. left of cutoff 1,740 1,820 1,677 4,318 4,529 4,116 
Eff. obs. right of cutoff 1,781 1,911 1,692 4,429 4,782 4,368 
BW estimate 37.80 38.14 35.98 57.32 59.48 53.91 





Table 11. Credit Decision, Gender, and Forward ROA: 
Controlling for Application and Default Probabilities  
The table reports coefficients and standard errors clustered by individual 
(in parentheses). The dependent variable is FORWARD_ROA and, 
compared to Table 9, both specifications include as controls the 
APPLICATION_PROBABILITY and the DEFAULT_PROBABILITY. 
Estimation method is the local linear regression with triangular kernel. For 
each specification, we report the bias-corrected RD estimates with robust 
variance estimator. The *** and ** marks denote statistical significance at 
the 1% and 5% levels. Obs. is the original number of observations. 
Effective obs. are the effective number of observations (determined by the 
bandwidth) left and right of the cutoff. BW estimate is the estimate of the 
bandwidth and BW bias is the associated bias. The bandwidth selection 
procedure is the one proposed by Calonico et al. (2014). The bias-
corrected RD estimator and the robust variance estimator are obtained 
according to Calonico et al. (2018) and Calonico at el. (2014), 
respectively. 
 Female applicants Male applicants 
Granted 0.018*** 0.020*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) 
Control variables  Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 16,097 79,243 
Eff. obs. left of cutoff 1,820 4,529 
Eff. obs. right of cutoff 1,911 4,782 
BW estimate 38.14 59.48 
BW bias 70.12 90.22 
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Figure 1. Our Bank Compared to other Systemic European Banks 
Figure 1a shows the regression between the ratio of market to book value of equity of our bank in 2017 over the 
period 1985-2018 and the average of the 32 European systemic banks (32 observations). Figures 1b and 1c show the 
equivalent regressions for liquidity and ROA. The coefficient estimates of all three lines are statistically significant 
at the 1% level and correlation coefficients are 0.43, 0.34, and 0.35, respectively. 
 
Figure 1a             Figure 1b 







Figure 2. Percentage of Rejected Loans to Small Firms in the Eurozone and by our Bank 
The figure plots the annual mean of rejected loans to small and micro firms in the euro area (data from SAFE) and the equivalent for 





Figure 3. Leverage and ROA in Northern European Small Firms vs. our Sample 
The figure plots the annual mean of leverage (Figure 3a) and ROA (Figure 3b) of small and micro firms in Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Germany, and the Netherlands (solid lines) and the equivalent for firms in our sample (dashed lines).  
 












Figure 4. Responses of FORWARD_ROA at the Credit Score’s Cutoff 
The figures show the responses of FORWARD_ROA (y-axis) at the credit score’s cutoff value (=0 on the x-
axis). The first figure uses the full sample of loan applicants, the second is for male applicants, and the third for 
female applicants. The points represent local sample means of the applicant’s income for a set of disjoint bins 
of control and treatment units spanning the full sample. We select evenly spaced bins that mimic the underlying 
variability of the data using spacings estimators. The continuous line represents a fourth order polynomial fit 













Figure 5. Responses of FORWARD_LEVERAGE at the Credit Score’s Cutoff 
The figures show the responses of FORWARD_LEVERAGE (y-axis) at the credit score’s cutoff value (=0 on 
the x-axis). The first figure uses the full sample of loan applicants, the second is for male applicants, and the 
third for female applicants. The points represent local sample means of the applicant’s income for a set of disjoint 
bins of control and treatment units spanning the full sample. We select evenly spaced bins that mimic the 
underlying variability of the data using spacings estimators. The continuous line represents a fourth order 








Figure 6. Manipulation Test 
The figure reports results from the manipulation testing procedure using the local polynomial density estimator 
proposed by Cattaneo et al. (2018). To perform this test, we rely on the local quadratic estimator with cubic 





In this appendix, we provide additional information on the validity of our identification methods. 
First, we provide evidence that our IV, AVERAGE_FEMALE_ENTREPRENEURS, does not 
directly explain the outcome variables in the IV regressions. Next, we show that the density of 
the credit score and other individual characteristics used as control variables in the RDD, do not 




Table A1. Directly Controlling for AVERAGE_FEMALE_ENTREPRENEURS 
The table reports specifications that replicate our baseline models but also include Average female 
entrepreneurs (our IV) directly in the models to show that this variable does not significantly correlate with 
our outcome variables. Specification 1 replicates the results of specification 1 of Table 3. Specification 2 
replicates the results of specification 3 of Table 4. Specification 3 replicates the results of specification 1 of 
Table 5. Specification 4 replicates the results of specification 3 of Table 5. Specification 5 replicates the 
results of specification 1 of Table 6. Specification 6 replicates the results of specification 5 of Table 8. All 
variables are defined in Table 1. The lower part of the table denotes the fixed effects, number of observations, 
and adjusted R-squared (if applicable). The ***, **, and * marks denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels.  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 









Average female entrepreneurs 0.041 -0.024 -0.020 2.450 0.011 -0.016 
 (0.105) (0.163) (0.144) (4.801) (0.118) (0.201) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 357,055 357,055 79,470 79,470 15,826 95,340 










Table A2. Additional Fixed Effects 
Specification 1 reports marginal effects and standard errors clustered by individual (in parentheses) from the 
probability (probit model) that a loan is originated (against the probability that the loan is denied). Specification 2 
reports coefficient estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) from an OLS regression on the credit score 
equation. Specifications 3 and 4 report coefficient estimates and standard errors clustered by individual (in 
parentheses) from the estimation of loan amount and loan spread equations using OLS. Specification 5 reports 
marginal effects and standard errors clustered by individual (in parentheses) from the estimation of the probability 
(probit model) that individuals reapply for a loan in the year after facing a rejection from the bank. Specification 6 
reports marginal effects and standard errors clustered by individual (in parentheses) from the estimation of the 
probability (probit model) that a firm defaults using our full sample. All specifications include the control variables 
of the equivalent specifications in Tables 3 to 7. The lower part of the table denotes the fixed effects, number of 
observations, and adjusted R-squared (if applicable). Compared to baseline results, the specifications include fixed 
effects for the head of the risk committee and the addition of a new female director in the bank’s board. The ***, **, 
and * marks denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 






one year Default 
Gender 0.007*** -0.032 0.060 -1.327 0.029** 0.013*** 
 (0.002) (0.041) (0.037) (1.740) (0.012) (0.004) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Head of risk dep. fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Female director fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 357,055 357,055 357,055 357,055 15,826 357,055 




Figure A1. The Credit Score around the Cutoff 
 
 
 
 
